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ABSTRACT
Dierentially-private histograms have emerged as a key tool for
location privacy. While past mechanisms have included theoretical
& experimental analysis, it has recently been observed that much
of the existing literature does not fully provide dierential privacy.
e missing component, private parameter tuning, is necessary for
rigorous evaluation of these mechanisms. Instead works frequently
tune on training data to optimise parameters without consideration
of privacy; in other cases selection is performed arbitrarily and in-
dependent of data, degrading utility. We address this open problem
by deriving a principled tuning mechanism that privately optimises
data-dependent error bounds. eoretical results establish privacy
and utility while extensive experimentation demonstrates that we
can practically achieve true end-to-end privacy.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Information systems →Location based services; •Security
and privacy →Privacy-preserving protocols; Data anonymization
and sanitization; •eory of computation →eory of database
privacy and security;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Location data is used widely, from ride-sharing apps in consumer
mobile to trac management in urban planning. But the utility
of location analytics must be balanced with concerns over user
privacy. A leading framework for strong privacy guarantees suit-
able to the seing, is dierential privacy [7, 8]. Many authors have
studied the release of spatial data structures to untrusted third
parties, for accurate response to range queries under dierential
privacy [5, 6, 10, 14, 20, 21]. However a recent large-scale analy-
sis [13] has discovered that reported evaluations in previous work
have parameter-tuned non-privately, undermining the validity of
much prior work. In this paper, we develop private tuning of spa-
tial histograms through optimising privatised data-dependent error
bounds, addressing the gap on end-to-end privacy (cf. Figure 1).
Aggregation has been used extensively for ecient range query
responses, and as a strategy for qualitative privacy [4]. Dierential
privacy complements such approaches by addressing aacker back-
ground knowledge; to date, various spatial data structures have
been adopted for private spatial data mining [5, 6, 10, 14, 20, 21].
,
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Figure 1: End-to-end private spatial data structures.
As research has established that utility is highly parameter de-
pendant [20, 21], parameters must be tuned on data, and there-
fore privately. Unfortunately, as documented recently [13], many
past works on histogram release establish dierential privacy of
mechanisms while ignoring privacy during tuning. e DPBench
framework [13] presented, articulates as an open problem the need
for end-to-end privacy for truly privacy-preserving mechanisms
and fair, rigorous evaluations.
In this paper, we address this problem by optimising privatised
data-dependent error bounds that quantify the eect of data struc-
ture parameters. Our focus is releasing histograms, as these are the
most widely used and eective spatial data structures [21].
Our mechanism consists of runs over two phases: 1) among all
values for the parameter, one is selected privately that is close in
utility to an optimum with high probability; 2) the data structure
is constructed & released privately using the selected parameter.
e main challenge is bounding utility of phase two with respect
to phase one’s parameter selection, and doing so privately. We
consider range query relative error [11, 24] as our objective when
choosing histogram grid size. Our bounds on this error decompose
into two errors, through a principled analysis: aggregation error due
to the (common) use of the uniformity assumption for aggregated
counts when data is non-uniformly distributed; and perturbation
error due to count perturbation for phase two dierential privacy.
Contributions. Our main contributions include
• For the rst time, a solution to end-to-end dierentially-
private parameter tuning for spatial data structure release;
• A two-phase mechanism for private parameter tuning and
data structure construction;
• Guarantees on dierential privacy and utility;
• Extensive experimental conrmation that our mechanism
is the new state-of-art for private accurate histograms.
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2 RELATEDWORK
Numerous proposals have sought to address the challenge of private
location-based services [12]. Aggregation has widely been used as
a qualitative privacy approach, by reporting aggregate numbers of
objects per partition cell in response to range queries [1, 9, 15, 17,
23]. Dierential privacy [7, 8] has also been adopted as a semantic
denition for privacy when releasing structures to untrusted third
parties. To achieve high utility, dierent variants of data structures
have been explored [5, 6, 10, 14, 21], such as spatial grid histograms,
quad-trees, kd-trees for point locations, for trajectories, as well as
user regions.
For each data structure, selection of parameters such as grid size
or levels of hierarchies, is known to be of the utmost importance in
aecting utility [20, 21, 25]. e authors in [21] propose Equation (1)
as a guideline for selecting grid size when releasing dierentially-
private grid-partitioned synopses:
m =
√
Nϵ
c
, (1)
where m is the selected grid size per direction, N is the number
of data points, ϵ is the total privacy budget and c is a constant
depending on the dataset. eir stated motivation is to balance
perturbation (noise) error and aggregate (non-uniformity) error,
and while they analyse each error component, their combination
is performed without rigorous justication. Moreover, the authors
tune c on their sensitive experimental datasets, simultaneously un-
dermining: c’s denition as a constant, potentially leaking privacy,
and overing their structures to test data. We refer to this grid
selection approach as Heuristic in experiments (cf. Section 8).
It has been noted that once a parameter is already tuned non-
privately on past sensitive data, that parameter can be used safely
on future unrelated datasets [13]. However, such xed schemes still
eschew optimisation by data-dependence. Not all datasets exhibit
the same levels of uniformity, point distribution or domain, as
discussed in Section 5. Such approaches like Heuristic obfuscate
the non-privacy of tuning m by secretly tuning c (or some other
constant in the xed rule). Any tuning must be privacy preserving.
e key challenge for this line of research, is that parameter selec-
tion must be data dependent but still preserve privacy. In machine
learning, private hyper parameter tuning has been explored [2, 3]
using cross validation. However, cross validation leverages split
test & train data, as it aims to mitigate future generalisation error.
Here we wish to make use of all data in all stages and are ultimately
concerned with range queries against this same dataset. e two
domains are related but pose fundamentally distinct challenges.
In [16], a private parameter selection mechanism, for 1D data,
is developed using dynamic programming. While it is speculated
that the approach extends to 2D data via reducing 2D structures to
1D with space lling curves, such curves do not preserve spatial
locality in general. As a result it is relatively easy to construct
counter examples to such extensions.
A principled evaluation for dierentially-private algorithms is
reported recently in [13]. e DPBench framework asserts that
end-to-end privacy is quite necessary, and highlights parameter
tuning as a key open problem for many existing mechanisms. We
are motivated by their call, and address the problem with our end-
to-end private approach for tuning and histogram construction.
3 PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
In Table 1, summary of notations and symbols used throughout
this paper are described.
Table 1: Summary of symbols used in this paper.
Symbols Description
D original dataset of points
D ′ neighbour dataset with D, diering in one record
Q set of query regions
t, Qt specication of a query region, including shape, size and position, t ∈ Q
C set of cells
ci count value for the i-th cell component, i ∈ C
di true number of data/points in cell i , within QR, i ∈ C
αi fraction of the overlapping area of QR with cell i , αi ∈ (0, 1]
G set of grid sizes, дr
дr size of a grid, number of divisions on each direction, r ∈ G
ρ sanity bound for the relative error, computed for a dataset D
Yi noise added to cell i
λ scale parameter of Laplace mechanism
δ a small value in (0, 1), used for the sanity bound
ϵ, ϵ1, ϵ2 privacy parameters
c constant in Heuristic approach
3.1 Spatial Data Structures
As discussed in Section 2, there is a wide range of spatial data struc-
tures [22] proposed for spatial object, from points, path trajectories,
to planar regions (bodies). Our focus on spatial histograms derives
from their wide popularity in supporting aggregate range queries.
Originally developed for eciency, histograms have found appli-
cation in qualitative privacy [4, 23]. Consider a dataset of points
(locations), D, where each record is a point. Figure 2 displays a
grid data structure of points (Figure 2a) and the resulting spatial
histogram H of counts ci per cell i ∈ C the set of cells (Figure 2b).
An aggregate range query is represented by a query region QR (a
red bolded rectangle in Figure 2), with corresponding responses as
an approximate count of points of D that fall in that query region.
We apply the uniformity assumption to quantify the contribution of
a cell as the cell count multiplied by the fraction of cell area in QR
(cf. Section 6).
(a) Grid (b) Histogram
Figure 2: Points, a 2 × 2 grid, and corresponding histogram.
3.2 Dierential Privacy
We adopt the dierential privacy (DP) [7, 8] framework due to its
strong guarantees on data privacy.
Denition 3.1. Databases D and D ′ that dier on exactly one
record, with D ′ having one more than D, are termed neighbours.
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Denition 3.2. A randomised mechanism M, preserves ϵ-
dierential privacy for ϵ > 0, if for all neighbouring databases
D,D ′ and measurable S ⊆ Ranдe(M):
Pr(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ϵ) · Pr(M(D ′) ∈ S) .
Dierential privacy requires that small changes to input (addi-
tion/deletion of a record) do not signicantly aect a mechanism’s
response distribution. As such sampling from the mechanism’s
output cannot be used to distinguish the input database.
Lemma 3.3 ([7]). Consider mechanisms Mi each providing ϵi -
dierential privacy, then the release of the vector of mechanism’s
responses on database D preserves
∑
i ϵi -dierential privacy.
Denition 3.4. e L1-global sensitivity (GS) of a deterministic,
Euclidean-vector-valued function f is given by ∆f = max
D,D′
‖ f (D) −
f (D ′)‖1, taken over neighbouring databases.
e simplest generic mechanism for dierential privacy smooths
non-private function sensitivity with additive perturbations.
Theorem 3.5 ([7]). For any deterministic Euclidean-vector-valued
f (D), the Laplace mechanism M(D) ∼ Lap(f (D),∆f /ϵ) preserves
ϵ-dierential privacy.
Another important mechanism enables release from arbitrary
sets that need not be numeric.
Theorem 3.6 ([18]). Consider a score function (or quality, utility
function) s(D, r ) ∈ R for database D and response r ∈ R. en the
exponential mechanism that outputs response r with probability
Pr(M(s,D) = r ) = exp(ϵ · s(D, r )/2∆)∑
r ∈R exp(ϵ · s(D, r )/2∆)
, (2)
preserves ϵ-dierential privacy for ϵ > 0 and ∆ = ∆s .
e exponential mechanism is typically used with ∆s =
supr ∈R ∆s(·, r ). However, using response dependent sensitivity
per term achieves the same privacy, with potentially beer utility:
Denition 3.7. Response-dependent sensitivity is ∆r = ∆s(·, r ).
4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We seek to address the problem of parameter tuning spatial his-
tograms in an end-to-end dierentially-private seing (cf. Figure 1).
Problem 4.1. Given point-set D, a set of query regionsQ, budget
ϵ > 0, our goal is to batch process D to produce a data structure
that can respond to an unlimited number of range queries through
privately selecting a grid size from given set G that optimises response
accuracy on queriesQ, while preserving ϵ-dierential privacy.
4.1 Evaluation Metrics
Specically, solutions should have the following properties:
Property 4.2 (End-to-End Differential Privacy). Mecha-
nisms should achieve non-interactive dierential privacy not only
in the release of a data structure based on spatial data but also in
parameter tuning e.g., grid size selection, of the structure.
Property 4.3 (Utility: Low Relative Error). Mechanisms
should achieve low total error on future query regionsQR, as measured
by relative error |response(QR) − true(QR)| /true(QR).
Figure 3: Expected error trade-o, demonstrating that opti-
mal grid size depends on the combination of error sources.
Property 4.4 (Efficiency: Low Computational Complexity).
Mechanisms should enjoy low computational time complexity in terms
of key parameters of the data and geographic area.
Error trade-o. We expect a trade-o between two sources of
error as depicted in Figure 3, illustrating the need to tune grid size:
aggregation error due to failure of the uniformity assumption when
aggregating for qualitative privacy; perturbation error due to count
noise introduced for dierential privacy.
5 COMMENTARY ON HEURISTIC
APPROACH
Qardaji et al. [21] propose the Heuristic grid size selection ap-
proach as the xed-rule Equation (1). An idealisation of the kind of
situation in which Heuristic fails is presented in Figure 4. Heuris-
tic might suggest a 4× 4 grid here (Figure 4a) based on the number
of points and assuming uniformity. However, a QR that happens
to be located over regions of non-uniformity—precisely where the
uniformity assumption fails–leads to erroneous query response.
For concreteness, if the four well-populated cells contain 100 points
each (with just 1 each within the QR), then the response on the QR
would be 100: each cell contributes 100 · 0.25. By contrast, on an
alternate 8 × 8 partitioning (Figure 4b), the response to the same
QR would be the correct count of 4. In this case, the uniformity
assumption and QR align perfectly. Heuristic is derived with re-
liance on the uniformity assumption, and is incapable of adapting
to datasets where it holds to a greater/lesser degree.
(a) 4 × 4 grid (b) 8 × 8 grid
Figure 4: e bolded red rectangle depicts the ery Re-
gion (QR), dots illustrate points. e non-uniformly located
points across theQR boundary resulting in erroneous count
using uniformity assumption for a 4 × 4 grid.
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Figure 5: Eect of grid size on response utility for Storage
dataset, demonstrating selection must be data dependent.
While the derivation of Heuristic considers both error sources
separately, the combination of bounds is not justied. Our approach
privately optimises a rigorously-derived bound on total error.
Finally, the recommendation c= 10 is determined not on un-
related datasets, but openly optimised utility on the evaluation
datasets. Not only does this practice violate dierential privacy [13]
but it fails to guarantee good utility when applied to future datasets.
Motivated by the expected need for balancing errors through
data-dependent grid tuning (cf. Figure 3), we explore utility vs. grid
size under the Storage dataset for xed QR of 1% of domain size
(cf. Section 8 for dataset details). is dataset was used in the non-
private tuning of c in Heuristic in [21]. While the results of the
tuning where not compared with the true optimum, we make this
comparison in Figure 5. e trade-o between errors is as predicted
(Figure 3). Moreover the grid chosen by Heuristic is far from
optimal, further conrming that xed parameters are unsuitable
for accurate responses, and that private data-dependent tuning is
needed.
6 APPROACH: E2EPRIV
Our solution to end-to-end ϵ-dierentially-private histogram re-
lease, E2EPriv, consists of two phases with budgets ϵ1 + ϵ2 = ϵ : 1)
Select one from a set of given grid sizes, by privately minimising
data-dependent expected error bounds on a given set of QRs; 2)
Construct a histogram with chosen grid size, privatized by perturb-
ing cell counts. Algorithm 1 (Section 6.1) describes these phases and
the process of responding to subsequent queries using the released
data structure is described by Algorithm 2 (Section 6.2).
6.1 Spatial Histograms Release
Consider Algorithm 1, which releases a tuned spatial histogram. In
Phase 1 [lines 1–15], a histogram H is constructed on D, for each
candidate grid size in G. In Phase 2, cell counts will be privatized
by adding Laplace-distributed r.v. Yi to count i as
Yi ∼ Lap(0; λ) , Var (Yi ) = 2λ2 , E [|Yi |] = λ , (3)
taking1 λ = 1/ϵ2. e idea behind the algorithm is to compute a
bound on the expected relative error that this (future) noisy his-
togram would incur, averaged over the QRs in Q, as evaluated on
the data D. e bound’s expression (Corollary 7.6) involves compar-
ing the histogram H response on each QR with the true count on
1Since the global sensitivity for histogram release is 1.
QR, and then to the absolute of this quantity (reecting aggregation
error) the expected perturbation (3).
Note that histogram response to QR involving the uniformity
assumption requires computation of the area overlap between each
cell i in H and the QR,
αi =
Area(QR ∩ celli )
Area(celli ) ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ C . (4)
Algorithm 1: End-to-End Dierentially Private Spatial His-
togram Construction via Private Grid Size Tuning
Input :Dataset of points D; Set of grid sizes G; Set of
range queries Q; Privacy budgets ϵ1, ϵ2
Output :Selected grid size д?; Histogram H′
1 Phase 1: Privately tune the grid cell size:
2 for д ∈ G do
3 Initialise histogram H of counts per cell (each sized д).
4 for p ∈ D do
5 Increment the count of H’s cell that p falls in.
6 for QR ∈ Q do
7 Compute overlap αi between QR & each cell i in H.
8 Compute H’s non-private QR response
response(QR) = ∑i αi · ci .
9 Count true(QR) number points in D falling in QR.
10 Compute error (QR) bound as per Corollary 7.6
11 Compute average error bound avдError over Q.
12 Set exponential mechanism score s(D,д) = −avдError .
13 Compute the probability of responding д, using
privacy parameter ϵ1, as Equation (2)
14 Compute bound/score sensitivity ∆д from
Corollary 7.9.
15 Sample д? as r w.p. ∝ exp(ϵ1 · s(D, r )/2∆r ).
16 Phase 2: Construct the private histogram counts:
17 Re-create the histogram H for chosen grid size д?.
18 Perturb the cell counts with iid Laplace noise per cell,
H′ = H + Y, Y ∼ Lap(0; λ), λ = 1/ϵ2.
To minimise averaged error bound (over each query in Q) we
set the exponential mechanism’s score function (cf. eorem 3.6)
for maximisation to be the negative error. To calibrate the mecha-
nism, we use the sensitivity of this score function as bounded in
Corollary 7.9. Detailed derivation of these bounds is provided in
Section 7. e result is a sampled д? which approximates the grid
size optimising the (data-dependent non-private) error bound.
In Phase 2 [lines 16–18], a private histogram is produced for the
chosen grid size д? using the Laplace mechanism—following the
same process as simulated in Phase 1.
Computational Complexity. Algorithm 1 is ecient with time
complexity O(|D | · |Q| · |G | · д2) and space complexity O(|G | + д2).
e parameter д is the largest grid size in G: it is necessary to touch
at least every cell.
6.1.1 Computing cell, QR overlap. Figure 6 illustrates an exam-
ple QR intersecting with a histogram cells.
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Figure 6: A query region,QR, intersectingwith grid cells and
its overlapping area of a cell.
To compute the fraction αi of overlapping area of a QR with a
cell i as dened in Equation (4), we have the special case of polygon
intersection from computational geometry [19]
Area(QR ∩ celli ) = xover lap × yover lap
where
xover lap = max(0,min(x12,x22) −max(x11,x21))
yover lap = max(0,min(y12,y22) −max(y11,y21))
cell coordinates = [(x11,y11), (x12,y12)] ,
QR coordinates = [(x21,y21), (x22,y22)] .
Note that
∑
i ∈C dαi e ≡ # overlapping cells.
6.2 Post-Release Rangeery Response
Algorithm 2: Range ery Response
Input :Histogram H with cells C; ery QR
Output :Approximate count response(QR)
1 for i ∈ C do
2 Compute overlap αi of i with QR, using Equation (4).
3 Compute cell’s contribute zi = αi · ci .
4 Sum the contributions response(QR) = ∑i ∈C zi .
Algorithm 2 takes histogram H, query QR, to a response. e
algorithm simply weighs each cell’s count by its overlap αi with
the QR, applying the uniformity assumption.
Computational Complexity. e range query algorithm is e-
cient in time O(д2) linear in the number of cells & constant space.
7 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Having described key concepts underlying Algorithm 1 in the pre-
vious section, we now derive the bound on expected error of Phase
2’s histogram release (Corollary 7.6), that is privately minimised by
the mechanism; we prove dierential privacy (eorem 7.10) and
provide a utility bound (eorem 7.11). A key component of our
analysis is in bounding sensitivity of our error bound to perturba-
tions in the input dataset (Corollary 7.9). By using a more rened
response-dependent sensitivity our mechanism enjoys improved
utility at no price to privacy (cf. Section 8.8 for a discussion).
We begin our analysis for the single tuning query case (Sec-
tion 7.1, and then extend to multiple queries (Section 7.2).
7.1 Case: Single Tuningery
We rst bound expected error of Phase 2 when responding to a
single (tuning)QR. We bound both absolute error, and relative error.
We introduce a constant ρ in the denominator of the laer in order
to control sensitivity in eorem 7.5, as discussed in Remark 7.3.
Theorem 7.1. For any given query region QR, the histogram H′
released by Algorithm 1 Phase 2 on data D achieves expected error
(wrt randomness in the Yi ) bounded as,
(i) Absolute error:
E [|response (QR) − true (QR)|] ≤
∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1.
(ii) Relative error:
E
[ |response(QR) − true(QR)|
max{true(QR), ρ}
]
≤ |
∑
i ∈C αici −
∑
i ∈C di | + λ‖α ‖1
max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} .
where ρ > 1 is a constant (cf. Remark 7.3), and di counts the number
of points in D falling in both cell i and QR.
Proof. Consider the rst case of absolute error,
E
[∑
i ∈C
αi (ci + Yi ) −
∑
i ∈C
di

]
≤ E
[∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di

]
+ E
[∑
i ∈C
αiYi

]
≤
∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1 ,
where the rst inequality follows from rearranging terms and ap-
plying the triangle inequality and monotonicity & linearity of ex-
pectation; the second inequality follows from the same arguments
combined with Equation (3):
E [|α · Y|] ≤
∑
i ∈C
αiE [|Yi |] = λ‖α ‖1 .
e second claim follows immediately. 
Remark 7.2. It is notable that the bound decomposes total (ex-
pected) error into two interpretable terms: |∑i ∈C αici −∑i ∈C di | re-
ecting aggregation error due to spatial aggregation and (potential)
failure of the uniformity assumption; and λ‖α ‖1 reecting error due
to random perturbation from the Laplace mechanism, where λ is noise
scale and ‖α ‖1 counts the (eective) cells overlapping the QR.
Remark 7.3. ρ > 1 is a user-dened constant, referred to as the
sanity bound in the literature [11, 24]. It is commonly used to control
sensitivity of relative error measures in the face of small true counts
that can potentially yield unbounded blow-up of relative error. Previ-
ous recommendations set it as ρ = δ × |D |, where 0 < δ < 1 is taken
to be a small constant reecting a pseudo-count fraction of D.
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As Algorithm 1 Phase 1 privately minimises the relative the
error bound on Phase 2 of eorem 7.1—using the exponential
mechanism—we must compute the sensitivity of this bound which
itself is data-dependent and hence privacy-sensitive. We cannot
simply optimise the error bound of eorem 7.1 directly, as implicitly
done by Heuristic, lest we breach data privacy.
We dene the exponential mechanism’s score (quality) function
as the negative relative error bound: maximising this score over
candidate grid sizes G, equivalently minimised the error bound,
which in turn is a close surrogate for minimising actual future error
of Phase 2 on the tuning query set Q.
s(D, r ) = − |
∑
i ∈C αici −
∑
i ∈C di | + λ‖α ‖1
max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} . (5)
And we make the analogous denition if optimising absolute
error:
s(D, r ) = −
∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 − λ‖α ‖1 .
To calibrate the exponential mechanism for dierential privacy,
we must bound the sensitivity ∆s of the score function.
Lemma 7.4. e global sensitivity of the absolute score function, is
bounded above by |1 − αi | which is at most 1, as each αi ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. From the reverse triangle inequality we have
GS(s) = ∆ = max
r, ‖D−D′ ‖1≤1
|s(D, r ) − s(D ′, r )|
≤

(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
−
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
≤ ||α1c1 + α2c2 + · · · + αici + · · · − (d1 + d2 + · · · + di + . . . )| −
|α1c1 + α2c2 + · · · + αi (ci + 1) + . . .
−(d1 + d2 + · · · + di + 1 + . . . )| |
≤ | |α1c1 + α2c2 + · · · + αici + · · · − (d1 + d2 + · · · + di + . . . )|
−| (α1c1 + α2c2 + · · · + αici + · · · − (d1 + d2 + · · · + di + . . . ))
+(αi − 1)| |
= |1 − αi | .

e case for relative error is much more involved.
Theorem 7.5. e response-dependent sensitivity of relative error
score function (5), for any r ∈ G and xed query t ∈ Q, is bounded
∆r s ≤ 1
δ (δ |D | + 1) +
λ‖α r ‖1
δ |D | (δ |D | + 1) +
1
δ |D | + δ ,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denes sanity bound constant ρ = δ |D |. We intro-
duce superscript r to α , to highlight explicit dependence on r ∈ G.
To prove the result we must bound the quantity 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
 + λ‖α ‖1
) ,
where ρ = δ×|D | and ρ ′ = δ×|D ′ | = δ×(|D |+1) = ρ+δ . e proof
proceeds by cases, based on where D ′’s extra point falls: outside
QR and cells overlapping QR (Figure 7a); outside QR, inside cells
overlapping QR (Figure 7b); or inside QR (Figure 7c). e reader
interested in the (technical) calculations for the full proof of the
theorem are referred to Appendix A.
7.2 Case: Multiple Tuningeries
Before proceeding to privacy and utility guarantees, we li the
above single query analysis, to the case of multiple tuning queries.
e rst step is bounding average Phase 2 error over query set Q.
is follows from eorem 7.1 and linearity of expectation.
Corollary 7.6. For given set of query regionQ, the histogram H′
released by Algorithm 1 Phase 2 on data D achieves average expected
error (wrt randomness in the Yi ) bounded as,
(i) Absolute error:
E
[
1
|Q|
∑
t ∈Q
|response (t) − true (t)|
]
≤ 1|Q|
∑
t ∈Q
(∑
i ∈C
α ti ci −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α t ‖1
)
.
(ii) Relative error:
E
[
1
|Q|
∑
t ∈Q
|response(t) − true(t)|
max{true(t), ρ}
]
≤ 1|Q|
∑
t ∈Q
∑i ∈C α ti ci −∑i ∈C di  + λ‖α t ‖1
max {∑i ∈C di , ρ} .
where ρ > 1 is a constant (cf. Remark 7.3), di counts the number of
points in D falling in both cell i and QR t , and α t denotes the vector
of cell overlaps with t .
For the general case, we therefore dene the exponential mech-
anism’s score function as before, as the negative of the bound on
the expectation of the error averaged over Q,
s(D, r ) = − 1|Q|
∑
t ∈Q
∑i ∈C α ti ci −∑i ∈C di  + λ‖α t ‖1
max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} . (6)
(a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
Figure 7: Cases in the proof of eorem 7.5 based on where
the extra point (dot) falls relative to the QR (red) and cells
overlapping the QR (the bottom right 3 × 3 cells).
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And again we make the analogous denition if optimising abso-
lute error:
s(D, r ) = − 1|Q|
∑
t ∈Q
(∑
i ∈C
α ti ci −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α t ‖1
)
.
We next extend the calculation of response-dependent sensitivity
of this bound to perturbations of the database D.
Lemma 7.7. For i ∈ I a nite index set, functions fi : X → R on
arbitrary domain, and constants ∆i ∈ R,(
∀i ∈ I, sup
x ∈X
| fi (x)| ≤ ∆i
)
⇒ sup
x ∈X
 1|I | ∑
i ∈I
fi (x)
 ≤ 1|I | ∑
i ∈I
∆i
Proof. Applying the triangle inequality and distributing the
supremum yields the result,
sup
x ∈X
 1|I | ∑
i ∈I
fi (x)
 ≤ supx ∈X 1|I | ∑i ∈I | fi (x)|
≤ 1|I |
∑
i ∈I
sup
x ∈X
| fi (x)|
≤ 1|I |
∑
i ∈I
∆i .

Corollary 7.8. e response-dependent sensitivity of averaged
absolute error score function over query set Q, for any r ∈ G, is
bounded by 1.
Proof. e claim bounds sensitivity of the absolute error score
function derived from the averaged error bound of Corollary 7.6.
e result follows immediately from Lemma 7.7 by taking: functions
fi as the sensitivities of the individual QR-specic score functions;
and the ∆i bounds on each fi as the single-query sensitivity bound
from Lemma 7.4. 
Corollary 7.9. e response-dependent sensitivity of averaged
relative error score function (6) over query set Q, for any r ∈ G, is
bounded
∆r s ≤ 1
δ (δ |D | + 1) +
(λ/|Q|)∑t ∈Q‖α r,t ‖1
δ |D | (δ |D | + 1) +
1
δ |D | + δ ,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denes sanity bound constant ρ = δ |D |. We in-
troduce superscripts r , t to α , to highlight explicit dependence on
r ∈ G, t ∈ Q.
Proof. e claim bounds sensitivity of the score function (6)
derived from the averaged error bound of Corollary 7.6. e result
follows immediately from Lemma 7.7 by taking: functions fi as the
sensitivities of the individual QR-specic score functions; and the
∆i bounds on each fi as the single-query sensitivity bound from
eorem 7.5. 
7.3 Main Results: Privacy & Utility Guarantees
With the Phase 2 error bounds and sensitivity of these bounds in
hand, we are able to present general guarantees for the end-to-end
Algorithm 1.
Theorem 7.10. Algorithm 1 preserves (ϵ1+ϵ2)-dierential privacy.
Proof. Phase 1 of the algorithm corresponds to the exponential
mechanism, in that its release is sampled according to the exponen-
tial mechanism’s response distribution, using the score function
(6). Since the algorithm uses response-dependent sensitivity ∆r as
bounded in Corollary 7.9 with privacy parameter ϵ1, it preserves
ϵ1-dierential privacy by eorem 3.6. Phase 2 uses the resulting
sanitized д? which expends no further privacy budget, but runs
the Laplace mechanism with sensitivity 1 (global sensitivity for
histogram release) with privacy parameter ϵ2. By eorem 3.5 the
second phase therefore preserves ϵ2-dierential privacy. Finally by
sequential composition Lemma 3.3, the algorithm in total preserves
dierential privacy at level ϵ1 + ϵ2. 
Our utility guarantee follows from our careful choice of score
function, as itself a bound on algorithm error, combined with utility
of the exponential mechanism [8, 18].
Theorem 7.11. Let GOPT = {r ∈ G : s(D, r ) = OPTs (D)} be the
set of truly optimising grid sizes—i.e., each achieves the maximum
score of all G grid sizesOPTs (D) = maxr ∈G s(D, r ); and let д? be the
output of Algorithm 1. en for all τ > 0
Pr
[
s(д?) ≤ OPTs (D) − 2∆
ϵ1
(
loд
( |G |
|GOPT |
)
+ τ
)]
≤ e−τ ,
where ∆ = maxr ∈G ∆r , each as dened in Corollary 7.9.
With high probability the selected д? ∈ G has a score close to
OPTs (D) by more than an additive factor ofO((∆/ϵ1) log|G |) [8, 18]
i.e., the error has only logarithmic dependence on |G |. Notably the
bound depends on ϵ2 (in addition to ϵ1), through ∆.
7.4 Discussion of Sensitivity Bound
Conventionally the exponential mechanism is used with a global
bound on score/quality function sensitivity ∆, so as to be indepen-
dent of response. Following this approach yields two alternative,
potentially more conveniently implemented, sensitivity bounds of
1
δ (δ |D | + 1) +
λ
|Q |
∑
t ∈Qmaxr ‖α r,t ‖1
δ |D | (δ |D | + 1) +
1
δ |D | + δ (7)
≤ 1
δ (δ |D | + 1) +
λmax{д2}
δ |D | (δ |D | + 1) +
1
δ |D | + δ , (8)
where the rst bound has removed dependence on grid size by
simply maximising over grid size in the single-query sensitivity
bound, then averaging. e second sensitivity bound follows from
the observation that the ‖α r,t ‖1 terms each quantify the eective
number of cells overlapped by theQR t , which cannot be any larger
than the total number of cells in the histogram. is in turn is
maximised by the grid size with largest number of cells. Figure 9
shows that maximising over the grid sizes perQR, will always yield
the largest grid size.
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(a) Storage, with 8, 938 points. (b) Landmark, with 869, 976 points. (c) Gowalla Check-ins, with 6, 442, 841 points.
Figure 8: Visualising the experimental datasets.
Table 2: Experimental settings. is table demonstrates the range of parameters, bolded are those that are varying.
Dataset, Size Grid Size (g) δ Sanity Bound, ρ = δ · |D | QR Size (%) Privacy Budget, ϵ ϵ1 (% of ϵ)
Storage, 8,938 points 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 0.1 893.8 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 64 1 20
Landmark, 869,976 points 200, 250, 300, 350, 400 0.1 869,9.76 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 64 1 20
Gowalla, 6,442,841 points 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800 0.1 6,442.841 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 64 1 20
Storage, 8,938 points 40, 60, 80 0.002, 0.001, 0.1 17.88, 89.38, 893.8 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 64 1 20
Storage, 8,938 points 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 0.1 893.8 1 0.2,0.4,0.6, 0.8, 1 20
Storage, 8,938 points 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 0.1 893.8 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 64 1 20, 25, 50, 75
Both of these alternative approaches would be natural to use
with the exponential mechanism, as response-independent global
sensitivities. However, they are both upper-bounds on our response-
dependent sensitivity and as such can lead to lower utility. We
demonstrate this eect experimentally in Section 8.8.
8 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
We now describe our comprehensive experimental study.
8.1 Baselines
We employ three baselines mechanisms in our comprehensive
evaluation. Compared to our truly end-to-end private approach,
these approaches are either partially private or not dierentially
private on new datasets.
Heuristic [21] computes grid size via Equation (1), as described
in Sections 2 and 5. e authors select c = 10 based on tuning
to the datasets used here. We expect privacy only when c is not
tuned, and as argued, it is not adaptive to the underlying data, but
(a) 2 × 2 grid (b) 4 × 4 grid
Figure 9: Maximising over grid sizes, will be always the
largest one.
is based on (partly) principled derivation.
Leaky is a semi-private approach, tuning grid size by adding noise
to the original histogram counts (privately) but then comparing
dierent grid sizes on sensitive data non-privately. e entire
privacy budget is allocated to the histogram release, none to
(non-private) tuning.
BestNonPriv non-privately releases the unpertrubed histogram.
Without considering noise, tuning optimizes aggregate error alone,
and so always chooses the largest grid size.
8.2 Datasets
We run experiments on three datasets—Storage, Landmark, Gowalla
Check-ins—ranging in size, uniformity and sparsity as visualised
in Figure 8. ese datasets were used in [21] to evaluate and in fact
tune Heuristic (nding c = 10). In this way, we deliver Heuris-
tic a signicant advantage, providing a fair and comprehensive
comparison between our mechanism and the baselines.
Two datasets are in the USA. e rst dataset, Storage 8a, consists
of US storage facility locations composed of national chain storage
facilities in addition to locally owned and operated facilities. is is
a small dataset of 8,938 points. Geographical coordinates range over
(-125.5, -65.5) and (25.0, 50.0) for longitude and latitude respectively.
Geographical distances are 60 for Lon axis and 25 for Lat axis.
e distance in metres for the x axis is ≈6000Km, and for y axis
is ≈2800km. e second dataset, Landmark Figure 8b, is a large
dataset of 869,976 points. is is a dataset of locations of landmarks
in the 48 US continental states. e listed landmarks range from
schools and post oces to shopping centres, correctional facilities,
and train stations from the 2010 Census TIGER point landmarks.
As indicated in [21], this dataset appears to match the population
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(a) Storage dataset. (b) Landmark dataset. (c) Gowalla Check-ins dataset.
Figure 10: Eect of QR size (% of total area) in performance; computing median relative error per query size.
distribution in the USA. In terms of domain specication, size,
longitude and latitude ranges, the dataset is identical to Storage.
e third and nal dataset is the check-in dataset obtained from
the Gowalla location-based social network, where users share their
locations by checking in. is dataset has the time and location
information of check-ins made by users over the period of Febru-
ary 2009–October 2010. For the purpose of this experiment only
the location information has been used. is dataset consists of
6,442,841 points, making it a large-sized dataset spanning the entire
world map, Figure 8c. e range for Longitude (x-axis) and Latitude
(y-axis) are (80.0, -60.0) and (180.0, -160.0) respectively. Lon axis
distance in the geographical system is 340 and Lat is 140, where in
the metric system these correspond to ≈8,000km and ≈16,000km
respectively.
8.3 Parameter Settings
Table 2 summarises seings, with bolded parameters varying. e
initial values for the experiment’s parameters are as follows. e
suggested grid size for Storage by Heuristic Equation (1) is 29.88,
which we round to 30. For Landmark and Gowalla datasets Heuris-
tic selects 295 and 803 respectively. QR sizes given as input to
Leaky and E2EPriv approaches for tuning phases are in the range
of {.1, .2, .3, .4, .5, .8}, which indicates the percentage of domain
width and height, e.g.,.3 means 9% of the total area. We have used
the same QR sizes but with dierent random positions to evaluate
all the techniques. δ to be used for the sanity bound, ρ, in bounding
relative error during E2EPriv tuning is set to 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001
for Storage, Landmark and Gowalla dataset, respectively (relating
to the dataset size: for larger datasets we use smaller δ ). ϵ privacy
was initially set to 1. In terms of allocating privacy budget to our
approach E2EPriv, the initial seing was ϵ1 = 20% and ϵ1 = 80%,
which we later vary in Section 8.7. Although in the literature [6, 21]
few specic QR sizes are explored, we vary QR’s over the entire
range of the map area. In experiments requiring a xed QR, we
choose the smallest (most challenging) QR of 1% of total area.
8.4 Evaluation Metrics
In our evaluations we use the standard relative error without the
sanity bound—we have no need to control sensitivity (as within
our mechanism) and errors are more interpretable. Similar results
are observed when the sanity bound is introduced. e most ac-
curate method will always be BestNonPriv as it is non-private,
experiences zero perturbation error and tunes optimally. Each ex-
periment is repeated 100 times and per QR size we allocate 100
random positions as our set of query regions.
8.5 Eect of Variousery Regions
In this section the median relative error is computed for varying
QR size, to evaluate E2EPriv compared to the baselines.
Consider rst Heuristic, and observe that it can perform well
on its experimentally-tuned datasets, Figure 10—recall that it was
on these datasets that its c parameter was non-privately tuned. In
the results, our approach, E2EPriv, despite being fully dierentially
private is competitive with Heuristic, and sometimes superior. For
Storage Figure 10a, E2EPriv’s error for smallest QR is 13% while
Heuristic only achieves 19%. is dataset has been chosen by the
authors in [21] to show that their guideline holds for both large
and small datasets. However as depicted in Figure 5 the chosen
grid size is not optimal and E2EPriv can outperform the result due
to its data-dependence. For Landmark Figure 10b, the error for
the smallest QR is less than 2% and for Gowalla 5% (Figure 10c).
Computed errors for smaller query regions are generally higher,
due to the fact that errors for larger queries cancel out.
As expected Leaky is always superior to Heuristic and moti-
vates the necessity of having a private tuning technique. It demon-
strates that data-dependent tuning improves on grid size selection
signicantly. However, previous approaches have been non-private.
Furthermore, Heuristic is not data dependent and so oers no
guarantee it will work. In fact, where it has worked the best, it
has been tuned on the data, and not simultaneously private. e
existing open problem has been for a mechanism somewhere in
between, that is private but data dependent. For the remainder of
our experiments, we focus only on the Storage dataset.
8.6 Eect of Privacy Parameter ϵ
We vary the total ϵ budget to explore its impact on all considered
techniques, while xing QR to be 1% of the total area: cf. Fig-
ure 11a. As expected, by increasing privacy, accuracy decreases.
However somewhat surprisingly, E2EPriv outperforms Heuris-
tic even though Heuristic has been non-privately tuned on the
dataset.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11: Eect of (a) varying ϵ on histogram utility, computed as median relative error; (b) various ϵ1 and ϵ2 on histogram
utility, computed as median relative error; (c) sanity bound ρ on sensitivity.
8.7 Eect of Privacy Budget Allocation
Recall that our approach E2EPriv comprises two phases run se-
quentially, with total privacy budget split between the two phases.
In this section, we demonstrate the eect of dierent budget alloca-
tions to each phase and its impact on the released histogram utility
via computing the median relative errors for various test QR. As
shown in Figure 11b, for ϵ1 ≤ 50% the utility of our mechanism
remains almost invariant, providing a useful guide for allocating
privacy budget.
8.8 Eect of Sanity Bound ρ on Sensitivity
Figure 11c presents the eect of dierent δ parameters, and conse-
quently dierent ρ = δ |D |, on computed sensitivity bounds by the
various approaches derived in Section 7: our preferred response-
dependent bound (Corollary 7.9), and the two looser response-
independent sensitivities (Equations 7 and 8). e results are shown
for grid sizes varying through 40, 60 and 80%. As shown, the
response-dependent ∆r does achieve tighter estimates compared
to the global alternatives. is dierence becomes more signicant
for reduced sanity bounds, e.g., when δ = 0.002 yielding ρ = 17.9.
e maxα alternative sees equivalent values to the maximum grid
size approach of response dependent sensitivity.
ese results conrm our expectation that using more careful
response-dependent sensitivity in the exponential mechanism as
applied to E2EPriv tuning’s Phase 1, can lead to beer sensitivity
estimates which can in-turn lead to superior utility at no cost to
privacy.
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we propose a rst end-to-end dierentially-private
mechanism for releasing parameter-tuned spatial data structures.
Our mechanism E2EPriv leverages a general-purpose concept of
tuning via privately-optimising bounds on error: with the bounds
on error derived from utility bounds on the data structure release
mechanism (in this case existing an application of the Laplace
mechanism for releasing histograms); and the private minimisation
of these bounds via the exponential mechanism. Key challenges in
accomplishing our results included the derivation of error bounds
and bounding of these data-dependent error bounds’ sensitivity
to perturbation. As a result of our careful analysis, we provide a
comprehensive analysis of dierential privacy and high-probability
utility.
Notably, our bounds on error central to parameter tuning, com-
prise terms reecting both aggregation error due to spatial partition-
ing and perturbation error due to post-tuning dierential privacy.
Our sensitivity calculations are response-dependent, permiing
parameter tuning to achieve superior utility at no cost to privacy
over coarse, global sensitivity approaches.
Comprehensive experimental results on datasets of a range of
scales, levels of sparsity and uniformity, establish that our principled
tuning-and-release mechanism achieves competitive utility while
preserving end-to-end dierential privacy.
In the literature, parameter tuning has been previously accom-
plished either non-privately (even tuning dierentially-private
mechanisms on test data) or by applying xed parameter guidelines.
We establish that neither style of existing approach is sucient,
and that private parameter tuning is achievable, and eciently
implementable.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of eorem 7.5
e theorem’s proof proceeds by cases, based on where D ′’s extra
point falls:
Case 1. Outside QR, outside overlapping cells (Figure 7a);
Case 2. Outside QR, inside overlapping cells (Figure 7b); or
Case 3. Inside QR, inside overlapping cells (Figure 7c).
We drop superscripts on αi for readability. Our task is to bound
GS(sr ) = ∆r s = max‖D−D′ ‖1≤1
s(D, r ) − s(D ′, r )
≤
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
where
ρ = δ × |D | , ρ > 1
ρ ′ = δ × D ′ = δ × (|D | + 1) = ρ + δ
roughout this proof we are going to have the following expres-
sion, which is always positive, so we can drop the absolute: 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

=
1
max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
Each case as enumerated above, has sub-cases based on the value
taken by the denominator.
Case 1. When the extra point is outside QR & outside overlapping
cells: ∑
i ∈C
d ′i =
∑
i ∈C
di & c ′i = ci ⇒∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
 + λ‖α ‖1 =
∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1 ≤ |D | + λ‖α ‖1
∆r s ≤
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

≤ (|D | + λ‖α ‖1) ·
(
1
ρ
− 1
ρ + δ
)
︸          ︷︷          ︸
δ
ρ (ρ+δ )=
1
|D |(ρ+δ )
≤ 1
ρ + δ
+
λ‖α ‖1
|D | (ρ + δ ) .
where three possible sub-cases occur:
Case 1.1
∑
i ∈C
di < ρ < ρ + δ
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
= ρ & max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
= ρ + δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1ρ − 1ρ + δ
Case 1.2 ρ < ρ + δ <
∑
i ∈C
di
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di & max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1∑i ∈C di − 1∑i ∈C di
= 0
Case 1.3 ρ <
∑
i ∈C
di < ρ + δ
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di︸                          ︷︷                          ︸∑
i∈C di>ρ⇒ 1∑i∈C di < 1ρ
& max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
= ρ + δ︸                           ︷︷                           ︸∑
i∈C di<ρ+δ⇒ 1∑i∈C di > 1ρ+δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1∑i ∈C di − 1ρ + δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} ≤ 1ρ − 1ρ + δ
, , Maryam Fanaeepour and Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
Case 2. When the extra point is outside QR & inside overlapping
cells, for some j:∑
i ∈C
d ′i =
∑
i ∈C
di & c ′j = c j + 1⇒∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
 + λ‖α ‖1 =
∑
i ∈C
αici + α j −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
∆r s ≤
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
Triangle inequality:
≤

 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)− 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
)
 + 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}λ‖α ‖1 − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}λ‖α ‖1

Reverse trianlge inequality:
≤
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
) +
λ‖α ‖1 ·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

Rearranging and factoring:
≤
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
((∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)
+ α j
) +
λ‖α ‖1 ·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

≤

(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
) (
1
max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
)
−
α j
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
 +
λ‖α ‖1 ·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

Triangle inequality:
≤
∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 ·  1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
 + α jmax{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
 +
λ‖α ‖1 ·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

≤
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
· 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
 + αimax{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
 .
≤ (|D | + λ‖α ‖1) ·
(
1
ρ
− 1
ρ + δ
)
︸          ︷︷          ︸
δ
ρ (ρ+δ )
+
1
ρ + δ
≤ 1
ρ + δ
+
λ‖α ‖1
|D | (ρ + δ ) +
1
ρ + δ
.
where cases 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 apply here as well, and result follows.
Case 3. When the extra point is inside both QR & overlapping
cells:
∑
i ∈C
d ′i =
∑
i ∈C
di + 1 & c ′j = c j + 1
From case 2 result, we have the following:
∆r s ≤
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
(∑
i ∈C
αic
′
i −
∑
i ∈C
d ′i
)  +
λ‖α ‖1 ·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

≤
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ}
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)
−
1
max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
((∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
)
+
(
α j − 1
)) +
λ‖α ‖1 ·
 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

≤
(∑
i ∈C
αici −
∑
i ∈C
di
 + λ‖α ‖1
)
· 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}
 + 1 − α jmax{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′}

≤ (|D | + λ‖α ‖1) ·
(
1
ρ
− 1
ρ + 1
)
︸          ︷︷          ︸
1
ρ (ρ+1)
+
1
ρ + δ
≤ 1
δ (ρ + 1) +
λ‖α ‖1
ρ(ρ + 1) +
1
ρ + δ
.
End-to-End Dierentially-Private Parameter Tuning in Spatial Histograms , ,
where again we have sub cases on the denominator.
Case 3.1
∑
i ∈C
di <
∑
i ∈C
di + 1 < ρ < ρ + δ
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
= ρ & max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
= ρ + δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1ρ − 1ρ + δ
Case 3.2 ρ <
∑
i ∈C
di < ρ + δ <
∑
i ∈C
di + 1
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di︸                          ︷︷                          ︸∑
i∈C di>ρ⇒ 1∑i∈C di < 1ρ
& max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di + 1︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸∑
i∈C di+1>ρ+δ⇒ 1∑i∈C di +1 < 1ρ+δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1∑i ∈C di − 1∑i ∈C di + 1
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} ≤ 1ρ − 1ρ + δ
Case 3.3 ρ <
∑
i ∈C
di <
∑
i ∈C
di + 1 < ρ + δ
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di︸                          ︷︷                          ︸∑
i∈C di>ρ⇒ 1∑i∈C di < 1ρ
& max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
= ρ + δ︸                           ︷︷                           ︸∑
i∈C di+1<ρ+δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1∑i ∈C di − 1ρ + δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} ≤ 1ρ − 1ρ + δ
Case 3.4
∑
i ∈C
di < ρ < ρ + δ <
∑
i ∈C
di + 1 < ρ + 1
max
{∑
i ∈C
di , ρ
}
= ρ︸                    ︷︷                    ︸∑
i∈C di<ρ⇒ 1∑i∈C di > 1ρ∑
i∈C di+1<ρ+1⇒ 1∑i∈C di +1 > 1ρ+1
& max
{∑
i ∈C
d ′i , ρ
′
}
=
∑
i ∈C
di + 1︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸∑
i∈C di+1>ρ+δ⇒ 1∑i∈C di +1 < 1ρ+δ
ρ+1>ρ+δ⇒ 1ρ+1 < 1ρ+δ
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} = 1ρ − 1∑i ∈C di + 1
⇒ 1max{∑i ∈C di , ρ} − 1max{∑i ∈C d ′i , ρ ′} ≤ 1ρ − 1ρ + 1
e nal upper bound for the response-dependent global sensitivity
becomes the bound computed for case 3, as it achieves the maximum
over all possible cases.
